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Abstract 
 
Taking a structuration perspective while integrating reciprocity research in economics, this study 
examines the dynamics of reciprocal interactions in social Q&A communities. We postulate that 
individual users of social Q&A constantly adjust their kindness into the direction of the observed 
benefit and effort of others. Collective reciprocity emerges from this pattern of conditional 
strategy of reciprocation and helps form a structure that guides the very interactions that give 
birth to the structure. Based on a large sample of data from Yahoo! Answers, our empirical 
analysis supports the collective reciprocity premise, showing that the more effort (relative to 
benefit) an asker contributes to the community, the more likely the community will return the 
favor. On the other hand, the more benefit (relative to effort) the asker takes from the 
community, the less likely the community will cooperate in terms of providing answers. We 
conclude that a structuration view of reciprocity sheds light on the duality of social norms in 
online communities. 
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Introduction 
 
The increasing popularity of online knowledge-sharing websites has attracted much academic 
interest in recent years. Past research has looked at general knowledge-sharing sites such as 
Wikipedia  (Nov, 2007) and Answerbag (Gazan, 2010), as well as specialized professional 
electronic networks (e.g., Chiu, Hsu, & Wang, 2006; Wasko, Teigland, & Faraj, 2009). One of 
the baffling questions to researchers is the motivation for voluntary contribution in these online 
spaces, for it seems irrational to contribute time and effort to help strangers online (Wasko & 
Faraj, 2005). Among many proposed motivational accounts, reciprocity is one that has been 
frequently mentioned in online community studies (Constant, Sproull, & Kiesler, 1996; 
Kankanhalli, Tan, & Wei, 2005; Kollock, 1999; Wasko & Faraj, 2005). Nevertheless, there is 
surprisingly little empirical evidence of reciprocity as an established norm of behavior at the 
community level in the online spaces. In other words, the existence of reciprocity (or lack 
thereof) has been researched mostly from the perspective of individual psychology (typically 
through a small sample of research participants), while the macro-level, collective patterns of 
reciprocation in online communities are largely unexamined. The aim of this research is to define 
and understand collective reciprocity by examining interaction patterns in social question and 
answer (SQA) communities – a prominent type of online knowledge-sharing community. 
Drawing on structuration theory in sociology and game theory in economics, we propose that 
members of SQA communities follow a “virtual order” (Giddens, 1984) of conditional 
cooperation that governs the reciprocal interactions in these online spaces. Empirical analyses 
based on a large sample of questions and answers in Yahoo! Answers largely support our 
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theoretical claims. 
 
This paper is organized as follows: We first discuss the characteristics of SQA within the 
intellectual context of communities of practice (CoPs) research. Then we propose collective 
reciprocity as a conceptual cornerstone for understanding reciprocal interactions in SQA. Next, 
we present data collected from Yahoo! Answers and test hypotheses based on the collective 
reciprocity premise. Finally, we discuss how this work contributes to scholarly understanding of 
reciprocal behavior in large-scale social networks. 
 
Are SQA Websites Communities of Practice? 
 
With more and more people turn to the Web for information, opinion, and advice, SQA websites 
have been thriving in the past decade. Popular SQA sites such as Yahoo! Answers and 
WikiAnswers each attracts tens of millions of unique monthly visitors (comScore, 2012). There 
also exist many specialized SQA sites such as Avvo (for asking legal and health questions of 
lawyers and doctors) and MathOverflow (for mathematicians). These SQA websites may differ 
in design and user demographics, but they all provide an online space where users express their 
information need in the form of natural language in anticipating public response (Shah, Oh, & 
Oh, 2009). In addition, most SQA sites provide facilitating features that allow a user to create an 
online profile and to rate the quality of answers. 
 
Are SQA sites online CoPs? Decades of academic debate in community studies has shown the 
difficulty of determining what is a community, and this task becomes even more daunting now as 
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Internet-based communication technologies afford ubiquitous and large-scale social interactions. 
Indeed, some online social networking services have millions of users who are geographically 
dispersed and may never meet face-to-face. It is therefore difficult for those people to develop a 
“sense of community” in its traditional sense (McMillan & Chavis, 1986; Reich, 2010). Wellman 
et al. (2003) go even further to claim that greater online access and interactions lead to 
networked individualism rather than community solidarities. A more recent stream of research, 
however, has been using the term “community” to describe the large online spaces such as 
MySpace (boyd, 2006), Youtube (Rotman & Preece, 2010), and Yahoo! Answers (Rosenbaum & 
Shachaf, 2010). 
 
A similar discrepancy arises when we look closely at the concept of CoPs. The term was coined 
by Lave and Wenger (1991) to refer to sets of professionals within a well-bounded community 
who have similar responsibilities. Most studies in the knowledge management field use the term 
in its original meaning (Cox, 2005; Wenger, McDermott, & Snyder, 2002). However, Murillo 
(2008) applied Wenger’s core constructs to assessing whether Usenet groups are CoPs and 
concluded that “true communities of practice” can emerge spontaneously in the online social 
spaces without face-to-face interaction. Hara, Shachaf, and Stoerger (2009) also try to extend the 
CoPs framework from organizational settings to open online communities that are not 
constrained by any organizational context. Brown and Duguid (2001) draw a distinction between 
“network of practice” and “community of practice”: Networks of practice form from informal 
and emergent social relations in which individuals interact for practice-related reasons, while 
CoPs is a specialized subset of networks of practice in which co-located individuals build strong, 
communal ties. In a similar vein, Wasko and Faraj (2005) differentiate a CoP from an electronic 
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network of practice, arguing that the former requires strong interpersonal ties and direct 
reciprocity while the latter consists of loosely knit members with little direct interaction. 
 
For the purpose of this study, we adopt Bruckman’s (2006) proposition of conceptualizing 
community as a prototype category in which some social groups are prototypical examples of the 
category whereas others are less typical examples. Just like a robin is a better example of a bird 
than a penguin, an online health support group (e.g., Bob’s Kneeboard studied by Maloney-
Krichmar & Preece, 2005) may have a higher “degree of prototypicality” (Rosch, 1978) in the 
community category than a general purpose SQA group such as Yahoo! Answers. This nuanced 
view of the community category helps us to step back from heated debate about the connotations 
of the term “community” and focus on mechanisms of online social interactions. Once we accept 
the notion that there are various degrees of membership in a category rather than a clear-cut 
inclusion–exclusion boundary, we may begin to examine the characteristics of SQA sites in the 
theoretical lens of CoPs and identify their resemblance to CoPs. 
 
Collective Reciprocity 
 
In SQA communities, an asker seeks knowledge from “kind strangers” (Constant et al., 1996) 
who answer the question without anticipating the asker to return the favor. In fact, a large 
number of questions posted on SQA sites are answered by a small army of “answer persons” 
(Turner, Smith, Fisher, & Welser, 2005) whose main goal seems to only help others, whereas the 
majority of users are one-time askers who have never contributed any answers (Adamic, Zhang, 
Bakshy, & Ackerman, 2008). Prior literature suggests that the asymmetry of contribution is a 
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common phenomenon across various types of online communities (Nonnecke & Preece, 2000; 
Shachaf, 2009; Whittaker, 1998). 
 
The voluntary contribution in online communities seems irrational from the economic 
perspective, as the contributors receive little immediate rewards. Some early Internet studies 
attempted to understand the motivations for voluntary contribution through the lens of gift 
economy (Barbrook, 1998; Raymond, 1998; Rheingold, 1993). For example, Rheingold (1993) 
suggests that virtual communities operate by the norms of gift economy, in which “people do 
things for one another out of a spirit of building something between them, rather than a 
spreadsheet-calculated quid pro quo” (p. 59). But Kollock (1999) argues that the acts of 
information sharing and knowledge contributing online are different from traditional gift 
exchange, as information is a special type of gift which can be given to more than one recipient 
without added cost. A gift of information is usually not from one individual to another but from 
one to many anonymous recipients in an open network. Thus, from the recipients’ point of view, 
they may tap into the gifts when in need, without bearing an obligation of repaying the gift 
givers. Furthermore, as an individual can join or leave an online community at any time, the 
obligation of reciprocity is almost impossible to enforce. 
 
Some sociologists have also argued that information sharing in online spaces is likely to form 
networked individualism rather than communal reciprocity (Wellman, 2001; Reich, 2010). 
Unlike symmetric social networks such as Facebook in which friendship is always directly 
reciprocal, the question–answer relationship in large-scale SQA communities is usually one-
directional and non-reciprocal. The lack of direct reciprocity means that there is no assurance 
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that an asker gets a good answer, nor does an answerer know if her favor will ever be returned. 
As a result, Wasko and Faraj (2005) and other researchers (e.g., Chiu et al., 2006; Lampel & 
Bhalla, 2007) turn to social capital elements such as reputation and status for explaining the 
voluntary contributions in online social spaces. 
 
Yet, there seems to be some kind of equilibrium in information giving and taking that keeps the 
online SQA communities healthy and sustainable. Indeed, if everyone consumes knowledge 
contributed by others without giving back, SQA sites such as Yahoo! Answers would not have 
thrived for many years. Kollock (1999) contends that a balanced reciprocity with each individual 
participant is not possible, but there should be a rough balance with a community as a whole over 
time. Similarly, Constant et al. (1996) and Kankanhalli et al. (2005) argue that while a 
contributor provides a gift of information without anticipating immediate reciprocation, a future 
reciprocation is somewhat expected. Wasko et al. (2009) hypothesize that the creation of 
knowledge in electronic networks is characterized by a pattern of generalized exchange, in which 
a giving is reciprocated by a third party rather than the recipient. 
 
We conceptualize the generalized exchange observed in Wasko et al. (2009) as collective 
reciprocity. In line with recent economic literature, we view reciprocity as a behavioral response 
to perceived kind or unkind intentions in bilateral interactions (Falk & Fischbacher, 2006; 
Stanca, 2010). Collective reciprocity, therefore, is a collective patterning in responding to kind or 
unkind intentions in multilateral interactions in a social network. Just as in bilateral interactions, 
fairness is desirable in multilateral interactions where kind intentions are rewarded and unkind 
intentions are punished (Cox, Friedman, & Gjerstad, 2007; Falk, Fehr, & Fischbacher, 2008; 
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Fehr & Gächter, 2000). 
 
While “collective reciprocity” and “generalized exchange” both refer to the social exchange in 
an n-person network, we prefer the former term for the following reasons. First, generalized 
exchange is a core concept in social exchange theory (Ekeh, 1974) that focuses on explaining 
social dilemma puzzles under the assumption of rational choice (e.g., Yamagishi & Kiyonari’s 
(2000) study of in-group favoritism in a Prisoner’s Dilemma game and Takahashi’s (2000) 
model of “pure-generalized exchange” in computer simulations). By contrast, we emphasize the 
emergent social norm of collective reciprocity on which generalized exchange can be based.  
Second, although we share Takahashi’s (2000) view that generalized exchange results from 
individual actors’ “fairness-based selective giving”, we are more interested in the collective 
nature of such giving at the community-level rather than the chain-like indirect reciprocity 
among actors (Bearman, 1997; Nowak & Sigmund, 2005). Third, in online SQA communities a 
question often receives more than one answer from multiple users, so the term “collective 
reciprocity” better captures the collectiveness of the reciprocation effort.  
 
The notion of collective reciprocity also moves beyond some conventional conceptualizations of 
voluntary contribution in online communities. The gift economy framework connotes a returned 
favor in either present or future interactions (e.g., Lampel & Bhalla, 2007), but we argue that 
such an exchange of favor is not necessarily needed for multilateral interactions in online 
communities. Collective reciprocity is also different from altruism, although both may be 
classified as “other-oriented motives” (Peddibhotla & Subramani, 2007). In fact, collective 
reciprocity may be easily mistaken as altruism because community-level interaction patterns are 
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not immediately apparent to an individual observer. Altruism is a form of unconditional kindness 
that is independent of other people’s intentions or acts, while collective reciprocity depends on 
and emerges from constant interactions with others. Altruism is certainly an important motive in 
online knowledge sharing, but we shall not automatically assume its existence when direct 
reciprocity is not observed. 
 
The Duality of Collective Reciprocity 
 
We propose collective reciprocity as a conceptual cornerstone for understanding multilateral 
interactions in online knowledge-sharing communities. Thanks to digital archives of messages 
and user profiles in these communities, collective reciprocity is observable and measureable. In a 
typical SQA community, for example, the questions and answers along with details of the 
question–answer interactions are recorded. A complete record of these interactions constitutes a 
collective history that reveals the community’s trajectory over time. It is important to view the 
trajectory of such communities as a dynamic process in which normative rules are being 
constructed in practice. Collective reciprocity, therefore, is not an external rule imposed to a 
community; rather, it is being “written into being” (boyd, 2006) as community participants post 
questions and provide answers. Wenger (1999) describes this process of “congealing our 
experience into ‘thingness’” (p. 58) as the “process of reification.” However, reification is not 
merely a process of translating our experience into explicit expressions. There are official 
“guidelines” and “rules” created and posted by site owners or moderators in many online 
communities (e.g., http://answers.yahoo.com/info/community_guidelines), but the users are 
unlikely to read them. Rather, participation and reification are a duality that interplays and 
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defines each other. From this viewpoint, collective reciprocity is a reification of what individuals 
in a community do, but at the same time it defines what the individuals ought to do. This duality 
is fundamental to our understanding of collective reciprocity. 
 
Rosenbaum and Shachaf (2010) see the duality of participation and reification as an essential 
contact point between the concept of CoPs and structuration theory. In Giddens’ (1984) terms, 
social structure is “both medium and outcome” (p. 25) of social practices: Structure gives shape 
and form to social interactions, while at the same time these interactions reproduce and generate 
the structure. In a similar vein, Wenger states that an underlying structure should be understood 
as “an emerging property of interacting practices rather than their generative infrastructure” (p. 
289), and he acknowledges that his position is close to Giddens’ notion of structuration. For both 
Giddens and Wenger, normative rules of social structure are “virtual orders” (p. 17) that exist 
independently of any given individual, but the ability to follow the rules is grounded in 
individuals’ reflections and actions. In fact, Giddens (1984) distinguishes between reciprocity 
between co-present actors and reciprocity between “collectivities across extended time–space” 
(p. 28). The latter one is an account of structural properties of social systems in which reciprocity 
is not established by normative code or co-present agents but through “reflectively monitoring” 
the flow of interaction with one another and then acting upon it. This structuration view is the 
foundation for our understanding of the collective reciprocity in online communities. 
 
Hypotheses 
 
We designed our empirical study to examine the prominence and characteristics of the “virtual 
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order” of collective reciprocity in SQA communities. The reification of collective reciprocity is a 
behavioral patterning in responding to kind or unkind intentions in multilateral interactions. In 
the context of SQA, both the kind intention and the reciprocation are reified through question–
answer acts. Since SQA sites keep track of the acts and display the summary information as part 
of each user’s online profile, it becomes possible for the community members to reflectively 
monitor each other’s kindness and act upon it. Thus, we postulate that collective reciprocity is 
being dynamically constructed in question–answer interactions, where the kindness of a potential 
answerer is contingent upon the past effort and benefit of the asker. This is in line with Fehr and 
Schmidt’s (1999) observation of “inequity aversion,” a social norm formed on the basis that 
overcompensated users will be punished by not receiving the same level of reciprocation as the 
users who have over contributed. The ratio of past benefit (in terms of receiving answers from 
the community) to past effort (in terms of posting answers to the community) is a simple 
indicator of a user’s reciprocity status. We expect that an asker with a low benefit–effort ratio 
will be reciprocated better by the community than someone with a high benefit–effort ratio and 
vice versa. 
 
Since the only form of reciprocation in a SQA community is answer-providing, it is reasonable 
to assume that the number of answers the asker receives is a proxy for the effect of collective 
reciprocity, which is contingent upon the user’s reciprocity status. Thus, we hypothesize: 
 
H1a. There is a positive association between an asker’s past benefit–effort ratio and the number 
of answers she receives. 
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Almost all SQA sites organize the posted questions into categories to facilitate navigation and 
information seeking. When posting questions or answers, some users focus on one category only, 
while others may be active in different categories. An early study on mass interaction in Usenet 
found that newsgroup users often go beyond a particular newsgroup to engage in diverse 
conversations (Whittaker, Terveen, Hill, & Cherny, 1998). Arguello et al. (2006) also observed 
that Usenet users cross-post to different threads in order to increase her visibility. A few recent 
studies looked at cross-participation in online discussion groups as “boundary spanning” 
(Barcellini, Détienne, & Burkhardt, 2008) or “boundary reshaping” (Butler & Wang, 2012). 
However, to date little is known about the extent of and the motivation for cross-posting in SQA 
communities.  From our economic-behaviorist perspective, it is reasonable to postulate that some 
kind SQA users might endeavor to answer questions across categories and try to be helpful to as 
many people as possible, whereas those who ask questions in many different categories are likely 
to have an intention of exploiting the commons. The former shows a high variation of effort, 
while the latter obtains a high variation of benefit. We expect that these effort/benefit variations 
have influences on the reciprocity status of an individual user: 
 
H1b. There is a positive association between an asker’s effort variation and the number of 
answers she receives. 
H1c. There is a negative association between an asker’s benefit variation and the number of 
answers she receives. 
 
For most information seekers, it is often the quality of information that matters the most: A 
question may receive many answers, but the asker only needs one good answer to meet her 
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information need. Many SQA sites allow the asker to pick the “best answer” from the answer 
pool, indicating that the question has been resolved (Adamic et al., 2008; Shah & Pomerantz, 
2010). Thus, whether or not a question is resolved can be an indicator of the quality of the 
answers received.  Popular online SQA communities receive hundreds or even thousands of 
questions each day. For example, Yahoo! Answer’s official blog claims that the average rate of 
posting on the site is 10 messages (questions or answers) per second (Yanswersblog, 2010). Prior 
research also discovered that a large portion of questions in knowledge-sharing communities are 
answered by a small army of well-versed “answer persons” (Turner et al., 2005). In this context, 
a potential “answer person” has to be selective in answering questions, even if the question topic 
falls in her area of expertise. We have discussed that an answerer’s kindness is contingent upon 
the asker’s past effort and benefit, and we can further expect that the likelihood of getting a “best 
answer” is influenced by the asker’s past acts as well. The more the well-versed answerers 
engage in answering a question, the more likely the question gets a “best answer.” We 
hypothesize: 
 
H2a. There is a positive association between an asker’s past benefit–effort ratio and the 
likelihood of getting a “best answer.” 
H2b. There is a positive association between an asker’s effort variation and the likelihood of 
getting a “best answer.” 
H2c. There is a negative association between an asker’s benefit variation and the likelihood of 
getting a “best answer.” 
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Methodology 
 
Yahoo! Answers 
We chose Yahoo! Answers as our primary data source for the empirical investigation. Yahoo! 
Answers typifies the question–answer mechanism in online SQA: A registered user posts a 
question in one of the pre-defined categories to solicit answers from other users; if multiple 
answers are provided, the user may select a particular answer as the “best answer” and the 
system marks the question as “resolved”; if a question does not get any answer four days after 
being posted, it will automatically expire and be deleted from the system. The basic function 
model of the Yahoo! Answers is illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1. Yahoo! Answers’ Function Model. 
 
The user interface of Yahoo! Answers resembles a typical online forum in which messages are 
threaded in chronological order. However, once an answer has been chosen as the “best answer,” 
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it moves to the top of the thread and becomes more prominent than the rest of the answer 
candidates. Each user is identifiable through an alias and an avatar, which are hyperlinks to the 
user’s profile page where a history of her activities is displayed. The profile pages are accessible 
to everyone including non-registered visitors. 
 
Data Collection 
We programmed a Web crawler to collect questions and answers across 23 different categories 
on Yahoo! Answers. The data collection started on November 2009 and lasted for one month. 
For a user i, we define two actions: 

 when the user posts a question and  when the user posts 
an answer. Since each question/answer was associated with a unique user ID and a timestamp of 
when the question/answer was posted, we were able to construct a profile for each user in an 
offline process. In our panel data, we record the number of questions N(

)t and the number of 
answers N()t that the user has posted at the time she asks a new question. For each question qx, 
we record the number of answers received (NumAnswer(qx)) and the status of resolution 
(Resolved(qx)). The status of resolution is a binary measure of whether the question has been 
resolved or not (i.e., whether a “best answer” is identified).  
 
We used a reversed Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) (Hirschman, 1964) to measure users’ 
distributed benefit BenefitVar() and distributed effort EffortVar(). The original HHI is 
widely applied in market analysis to determine whether a market is an oligopoly. A high HHI 
generally indicates a concentration of market power, whereas a low HHI indicates high 
competition and market diversity. Butler (2001) adopted the HHI in his analysis of listserv 
messages and reversed the index (1 − HHI) to measure the daily topic variation in the sample 
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listservs. Inspired by Butler, we view each individual user as a firm and apply the reversed HHI 
in measuring the category variations of each user’s postings. The higher the reversed index, the 
more the category variations in user’s contributions. The advantage of using the reversed HHI as 
a variation measure is the ability to capture variation within a subset of question/answers while 
taking the total number of them into account. The formulas are as follows: 
 
BenefitVar() = 1 − HHI = 1 − ([S12 + S22 + … + Sn2]/QuestionCount) 
EffortVar() = 1 − HHI = 1 − ([S12 + S22 + … + Sn2]/AnswerCount) 
 
Sn is the percentage of questions a user has posted in category [1…n]. QuestionCount and 
AnswerCount are the total number of questions and the total number of answers the user has 
posted in the community, respectively. 
 
To summarize, we collected data on the following variables: 
 NumAnswer(qx): The number of answers received for question qx. 
 Resolved(qx): A binomial variable for recording whether question qx has been resolved. 
 N(

)t : The number of questions the user i has posted before time t which is the system 
timestamp when the new question qx is posted. 
 N()t : The number of answers the user i has posted before time t which is the system 
timestamp when the new question qx is posted. 
 BenefitVar(): The variation of user benefit in terms of posting questions. 
 EffortVar(): The variation of user effort in terms of answering questions. 
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Data Analysis and Results 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
We collected 129,331 questions (Nq) that received at least one answer. These questions were 
posted by 92,862 unique users across 23 question categories. A total of 139,055 users 
contributed 682,725 answers (Na). On average, each user contributed 1.39 questions and 4.91 
answers. The most prolific user has provided as many as 356 answers to the community. The 
number of resolved questions (Resolved(qx)) is only 11,448, or 8.85% of the total number of 
questions in the dataset. A summary of descriptive statistics of the variables in the dataset is 
presented in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics. 
Variable Mean SD Min Max 
NumAnswer(qx) 4.61 5.83 1 338 
N(

)t 0.71 2.27 0 68 
N()t 2.37 7.48 0 356 
N(

)t / N()t 0.29 0.84 0 33 
BenefitVar() 0.43 0.28 0 1 
EffortVar() 0.16 0.25 0 1 
Note: Nq = 129,331, Na = 682,725. 
 
Hypothesis Testing 
We use two regression models to estimate the hypothesized effects of collective reciprocation. 
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Model 1 is an ordinary least squares linear regression model for testing hypotheses H1a–c, and 
Model 2 is a logistic regression model for testing hypotheses H2a-c. Note that we include 
NumAnswer(qx) in Model 2 as a control variable because a larger pool of candidate answers is 
more likely to include a “best answer”. 
Model 1:  
NumAnswer(qx) = β0 + β1 * (N()t / N()t) + β2 * BenefitVar() + β3 * EffortVar() + ε 
Model 2:  
P(Resolved(qx)) =  
1 / (1 + (				∗	(()	/	())			∗			∗	 !"	∗	#$%&(')	) 
The regression analysis results are included in Table 2. 
 
TABLE 2. Regression Results. 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Coefficient t Coefficient z Odds ratio 
(Constant) 5.73*** 110.07 
−2.55*** −80.35 0.08 
N(

)t / N()t −0.202*** −9.52 −0.11*** −7.06 0.90 
BenefitVar() −1.67*** −20.13 −0.13** −2.85 0.88 
EffortVar() 2.21*** 28.04 0.68*** 16.66 1.96 
NumAnswer(qx)  0.03*** 21.83 1.03 
Goodness of fit R2 = 0.148 McFadden’s pseudo R2 = 0.369 
**p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. 
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Consistent with hypothesis H1a, Model 1 estimates a statistically significant negative 
relationship between an asker’s past benefit–effort ratio (N()t / N()t) and the number of 
received answers. The coefficient value of −0.202 means that for every unit increase in benefit–
effort ratio, we expect to see a decrease of 20.2% in number of answers. The negative coefficient 
for BenefitVar() indicates that the more a user posts questions across categories, the less 
answers she receives for her own question, supporting H1b; on the other hand, the positive 
coefficient of EffortVar() suggests that the more answers the asker has contributed in diverse 
topic areas, the more answers she is likely to receive, supporting H1c. 
 
The estimations from Model 2 also provide strong support for hypotheses H2. The negative 
coefficients of β1 and β2 mean that increases of the benefit–effort ratio and benefit variations 
both decrease the likelihood of getting a “best answer.” This supports H2a and H2b. The positive 
coefficient of β3 supports H2c, confirming a positive association between an asker’s effort 
variation and the odds of receiving a “best answer.” All these relationships are statistically 
significant, controlling the total number of answers received for the question. 
 
Discussion 
 
In our research context, the quantity of answers received for a question indicates the volume of 
collective reciprocation, while the quality of answers suggests the effectiveness of the 
reciprocation. The highly significant associations between the askers’ past acts and the quantity 
and quality of answers support our premise of collective reciprocity: The more effort (relative to 
benefit) an asker contributes to a SQA community, the more likely the community will return the 
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favor; on the other hand, the more benefit (relative to effort) the asker takes from the community, 
the less likely she will be reciprocated well in terms of getting answers for her own question. In 
the terms of game theory, collective reciprocity is the result of a behavioral mechanism that 
includes both conditional cooperation and punishment of non-cooperation (Gintis, 2000; Gintis, 
Bowles, Boyd, & Fehr, 2003). 
 
While research in anthropology has confirmed that direct reciprocity is routinely harnessed in the 
support of cooperation in small-scale societies (Boehm, 1986; Henrich, Boyd, Bowles, Camerer, 
Fehr, & Gintis, 2004; Wiessner, 1982), indirect reciprocity is more common in complex and 
large-scale social networks in which individuals meet randomly and may never interact with the 
same person twice (Faraj & Johnson, 2011; Henrich et al., 2010; Nowak & Sigmund, 2005). In 
Yahoo! Answers and other large-scale SQA communities, indirect reciprocity means that each 
individual may take the role of asker or answerer in different times but never with the same 
partner. In this context, a person can follow either an unconditional strategy, such as always be 
an “answer person” (Turner et al., 2005) or always be a free rider, or a conditional strategy that 
discriminates among the askers according to their past interactions with others in the community. 
While answer persons and free riders are both commonly seen in online spaces, our data provide 
indication that the users of Yahoo! Answers tend to take a conditional strategy of reciprocation—
one reciprocates provided others reciprocate as well. 
 
It is worth noting that while indirect reciprocity and collective reciprocity are two related 
concepts, they have different theoretical roots and each emphasizes on different aspects of 
reciprocal interactions. Indirect reciprocity has been discussed in economic literature, and the 
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discussions center on reciprocity as an intrinsic motivation for individual acts. Therefore, the 
concept is often used to explain the fragility of conditional cooperation in social experiments 
(Fischbacher & Gächter, 2010). By contrast, we ground the concept of collective reciprocity on 
structuration theory and use it to depict both a community norm and the reification of the norm. 
The constant evaluation of individual participants’ acts and the subsequent conditional 
reciprocation create the dynamics of collective reciprocity in a social network; at the same time, 
the observable dynamics give birth to an implicit community norm that reinforces the conditional 
cooperation. 
 
Another related concept in social network research is collective efficacy, which was proposed by 
community sociologist Robert Sampson and his colleagues (Sampson, Raudenbush, & Earls, 
1997) and later applied to electronic communities by John Carroll and his colleagues (Carroll & 
Reese, 2003; Carroll, Rosson, & Zhou, 2005; Kavanaugh et al., 2005). Collective efficacy is a 
concept originated from studies of local communities and denotes a neighborhood’s capacity in 
dealing with challenges such as violent crimes and socioeconomic inequality. The theory of 
collective efficacy moves away from a focus on strong social ties and emphasizes on “shared 
expectations and mutual engagement” (Sampson, 2004, p. 108) by residents in the neighborhood. 
This theoretical angle is similar to ours in that we view collective reciprocity as a shared norm 
among loosely connected users in online communities, who interact with each other based on the 
principle of collective reciprocity rather than strong, direct reciprocity. 
 
Of course, how a question performs in terms of attracting answers depends on many other 
factors. The relatively low R2 values from the regressions suggest that the models have limited 
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predictive power. Topicality, timing of posting, visibility of the asker’s online ID, and qualitative 
characteristics of the question (such as wording, grammar, and length) can all affect how a 
question is perceived and attended in online communities (Kim, 2010; Butler & Wang, 2012). 
For example, advice-seeking or conservational questions tend to generate more responses than 
factual questions (Harper, Weinberg, Logie, & Konstan, 2010). Another possible influence on 
the actual effects of collective reciprocity is the social network structure of the category sub-
groups (Kang, Kim, Gloor, & Bock, 2011). Users active in certain category groups (for example, 
the “Pregnancy & Parenting” category in Yahoo! Answers) may have relatively dense network 
structures and are more engaged in question–answer interactions. Also, a user who posts 
frequently gains visibility and familiarity among community members, so a question from her is 
more likely to get a response than a question from a new ID. Future research may be carried out 
to analyze the network structure of meaningful sub-groups (for instance, based on a taxonomy of 
question types proposed by Harper et al., 2010) in SQA communities to examine the effect of 
network structure on the reciprocal behaviors. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Taking a structuration perspective while integrating reciprocity research in economics, the 
present study examines the dynamics of reciprocal interactions in online question answering. 
Communities as social entities in time and space are made up of individuals, and the parameters 
that characterize and shape collective behavior in the communities ultimately derive from 
individual behaviors. The empirical work presented in this paper shows that individuals in a 
SQA community constantly adjust their kindness into the direction of the observed benefit and 
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effort of others. When many individuals in the community follow this conditional strategy of 
reciprocation, a pattern of collective reciprocity emerges. Moreover, this emergent pattern of 
reciprocal interaction reinforces the normative order of conditional reciprocation.   
 
The study contributes on enhancing our understanding of reciprocal behavior in online spaces 
and provides empirical evidences to support the collective reciprocity premise. The concept of 
collective reciprocity not only enriches our vocabulary in scholarly discussion of online 
communities but also provides insights for community designers. Our observation of conditional 
reciprocation echoes findings in Ma and Agarwal (2007) and Chen, Harper, Konstan, and Li 
(2010) in that member profiling and visibility of contributions are crucial elements in designing 
online CoPs. 
 
Previous studies of online communities tend to view reciprocity as one of the individual 
motivations behind knowledge-sharing behaviors. We contend that reciprocity in online 
communities can be understood as a normative rule being constructed and reified through social 
interactions. The seemingly altruistic conduct of knowledge contribution by many “kind 
strangers” is not unconditional; rather, the habitual style is shaped by a network context in which 
social exchange is partially governed by the principle of “fairness-based selective giving”. Thus, 
our conception of online CoPs attempts to provide an explanatory framework that encompasses 
both the micro-level human behavior and the macro-level social structure. We show that 
different literatures in sociology and economics can be brought together in the analysis of 
structural forms of online communities. 
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Finally, we would like to conclude this paper by quoting Wenger (1999), who elegantly 
describes the duality of CoPs and the reciprocal relations in these communities: “Our experience 
and our world shape each other through a reciprocal relation that goes to the very essence of who 
we are. The world as we shape it, and our experience as the word shapes it, are like the mountain 
and the river. … The river only carves and the mountain only guides, yet in their interaction, the 
carving becomes the guiding and the guiding becomes the carving” (p. 71). 
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